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Article 7

NOTES
TAXATION -

ESTATE

TAX -

THE LIFE ESTATE WITH A POWER OF DISPOSITION

AND THE LIFE INSURANCE SETTLEMENT OPTION:

CANDIDATES FOR THE MARITAL

DEDUCTION.

I.

Introduction
The life estate with a power of disposition and the life insurance option are
two types of devisable interests which have been especially troublesome to the estate
planner seeking qualification under the marital deduction. In the field of estate

planning and taxation, where the rigid letter of the law is enforced-sometimes
to the detriment of the spirit-it is not surprising that the drafter is frequently in
dispute with the taxing authorities. Case law and Treasury Regulations are the two
most reliable guides in interpreting the statute and determining what drafting
language will be successful. In that respect recent developments concerning both
the life estate and the life insurance option make it advisable to take another look
at the tax consequences of these interests. First, however, it is necessary to consider
the background of the life estate, the insurance option, and the taxing statute in
order to establish a common basis for discussion.
The life estate with a power of disposition as a means of testamentary disposition of property is popular. An example of a power of disposition or invasion would
be: "Residuary estate to my wife for the term of her natural life with full power
to use, enjoy, sell, or dispose of the income and principal thereof as she in her
uncontrolled discretion may choose, remainder, if any, to ....

.1

Often the testator desires to leave his property to his wife so that she may
use it in any manner that she sees fit; but at the same time, he does not want to
appear callous in completely excluding his children. In such a case, the life estate
with a power of disposition seems to be what he is looking for. If the testator's
2
attorney agrees, then the tax aspects of the disposition should be investigated.
The life insurance settlement option is really a species of the life estate with
a power of disposition. The chief difference is that the corpus of the life estate is
the proceeds of a life insurance policy rather than some other property. Under
the settlement options, the proceeds of the policy are not immediately paid out, but
are: (1) held at interest; (2) distributed in periodic installments over a fixed num3
ber of years; or (3) distributed in the form of a life annuity to a stated beneficiary.

In any case, the surviving spouse is given a life interest with power to invade the
1 A similar estate was contested and found not to qualify in Pipe v. Commissioner, 241
F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 814 (1957). A more limited example is a life
estate with power to consume such as: "to my wife for life, with the power in my wife to
dispose of the property and to use the proceeds as she deems necessary for her support and
maintenance, remainder to .... "
The life estate with a power of disposition may be a two-edged sword. Among its advantages2 are:
(1) It provides a fluctuating income to enable the surviving
spouse to meet
hardships.
(2) It makes possible a protection of the property against swindlers by
imposing a condition that the sale of the property be for full consideration.
(3) It can be used to discourage remarriage.
(4) It has a possible economic advantage over trusts if the corpus is less
than $25,000.
On the other hand, its disadvantages are:
(1) The remaindermen can be completely cut out.
(2) The protective restrictions cloud the title to the corpus.
(3) It is difficult to trace the corpus through the hands of the spouse in
determining the remaindermen's share.
(4) It has proved to be unusually litigious.
For a discussion of the estate generally, see Note, 32 NoTR DAME LAWYER 141 (1956).
3 Waldo, Utmost Care Is Needed in Qualifying Insurance for the Marital Deduction, 13
J. TAxATiON 280 (1960).
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principal as she wills, remainder, if any, to a third party. While the settlement
option, as has been pointed out, is merely a form of the life estate, it contains several
peculiar, crucial tax problems which will be discussed later.
This brief outline of the nature of, the interests should provide a sufficient
framework upon which to found a discussion of their tax consequences. The drafter
must constantly recognize, however, that there are many important property and
estate planning aspects to be investigated in creating the testamentary instrument.
Some of these aspects may outweigh the tax advantages. Tax planning has been
defined as "the obtaining of whatever tax economies are consistent with overall
human objectives of estate planning." 4 With this in mind, the next step is to look
to the statutory provisions to which he must strictly adhere.
The marital deduction first appeared in the Internal Revenue Code in 1948.
Its declared purpose is to make the federal estate tax burden more equitable for
common law property states.5 Formerly the residents of community property states
received a tax advantage since, in such jurisdictions, each spouse possesses an undivided one-half interest in fee in the community property. In order to equalize the
tax burden, it was necessary to allow a deduction, of an amount equal to one-half
the value of the decedent's adjusted gross estate, to be subtracted from the value
of all property passing from the decedent to his surviving spouse.Since the only purpose in allowing the marital deduction is to neutralize the
advantage of the community property states, it follows that only interests equivalent
to community property interests passing to the surviving spouse should be allowed
the deduction. In keeping with this theory, section 2056(b) 7 provides that no
marital deduction is allowed with respect to certain property interests known as
terminable interests. Termihable interests have been defined as interests "which
will terminate or fail on the lapse of time or on the occurrence or the failure to
occur of some contingency."" Such terminable interests, e.g., life estates, are not
the equivalent of the estate which passes tax-free in community property states and
should not be allowed the deduction.
There are, however, three exceptions to the terminable interest rule. They
are: (1) A deduction is allowed if the only condition under which the interest will
terminate is the death of the surviving spouse within six months after the decedent's
death and the condition does not occur.9 (2) A deduction is allowed if a life
interest in property passes to the surviving spouse (whether in trust or not) and
the spouse is entitled to all the income from all or a specific portion of the property,
coupled with a power in her to appoint her entire interest in the property. 10 (3) A
deduction is allowed if the interest in property passing to the surviving spouse
consists of proceeds held by an insurer under the terms of a life insurance contract,
provided she complies with certain conditions." The first exception is beyond the
scope of this discussion, but the second and third exceptions are the life estate with
a power of disposition and the insurance settlement option respectively.
The federal tax regulations list five conditions for the allowance of the deduction to the life estate and five conditions for the allowance to the insurance option.
The conditions which must be met by the .life estate are:12 (1) The surviving
spouse must be entitled for life to all of the income from the entire interest or a
specific portion of the entire interest, or to a specific portion of all the income from
4 Lawthers, Basic Planning Principles in Qualifying Life Insurance for the Marital Deduction, 37 TAxEs 723 (1959).
5 S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, pt. 2 (1948).
6 TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c) (1).
7 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(1).
8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-i(b) (1960).
9

10

11

12

TNT.

REv. CODE

OF

TNT. REv. CODE OF
TNT. REv. CODE OF

1954, § 2056(b) (3).
1954, § 2056(b) (5).
1954, § 2056(b) (6).

Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (1960).
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the entire interest. (2) The income must be payable annually or at more frequent
intervals. (3) The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint the entire
interest or the specific portion to either herself or to her estate. (4) The power
must be exercisable by the surviving spouse alone, and in all events. (5) The
interest must not be subject to a power in another person to appoint to any person
other than the surviving spouse. Correspondingly, the conditions to be met by the
insurance settlement option are:'2 (1) The proceeds of the policy must be held by
the insurer subject to an agreement either to pay the entire proceeds or a specific
portion thereof in installments or'to pay interest thereon, and the payments during,
the life of the spouse must be made only to her. (2) The installments or interest
must be payable annually or at more frequent intervals, commencing not later
than 13 months after the decedent's death. (3) The surviving spouse must have
the power to appoint the amounts so held by the insurer to either herself or her
estate. (4) The power must be exercisable by the surviving spouse alone and in
all events. (5) The amounts payable under such contract must not be subject to
a power in another person to appoint to any person other than the surviving spouse.
With the applicable statutory provisions and administrative regulatory interpretation of the statute set dut, it is possible to proceed in considering how specific
estate plans have fared in the courts.
The Life Estate With a Power of Disposition
The leading case dealing with' the qualification of the life estate with a power
of disposition for the marital deduction is Pipe v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.14 While Pipe was decided under the pre-1954 Code, it would not be wise to
disregard it today.
The testator devised and bequeathed a life estate to his wife, "with full power
II.

to use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income and principal thereof, . . . as she in her
uncontrolled discretion may choose, . . . except that she shall have no power

over the disposition of such part thereof as remains unexpended at the time of her
death." The remainder of the estate, if any, was to go to certain named legatees.
The first contention for the testator was that the life tenancy was the equivalent
of an absolute ownership under a New York Statute 5 changing some life estates
with the power of disposition into fee absolutes for certain purposes. This view
was rejected by the court because one of the most significant elements of absolute
ownership, namely, testamentary power, was absent.
The second contention in Pipe was that even if the bequest did not convey a
fee simple, it nevertheless qualified for the marital deduction under the predecessor
of subsection 2056(b) (5), as a trust coupled with the power of appointment. 16
The court also rejected this view. According to the Treasury Regulations, the widow
must have a power to appoint the corpus to herself' 7 as unqualified owner or to
appoint the corpus as part of her estate. Clearly the wife had no testamentary
power, and the court claimed that there was no unlimited power to invade free
of the trust because as long as the corpus remains it will be held in trust for the
remainderman. The crux of the argument seems to be that the wife, during her
lifetime, could not appoint the entire corpus to herself "free of the trust" because
there would be a trust imposed upon her to refrain from squandering the corpus
13 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6(a) (1960).
14 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957).
15 N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 149 (McKinney 1946).
16 Since Pipe v. Commissioner was decided under the 1939 Code, it was necessary to claim
that the life interest was held in trust. Under the 1954 Code the life estate barren of any trust
was made to qualify. The court in the present case assumed arguendo that the bequest created
a trust.
17 It is customary in this field to speak of the surviving spouse as the wife although the
same results would occur if it were the husband, of course.
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to defeat the remainder. No provision was made in18the will for the cessation of
the remainder upon the appropriation of the corpus.'
Judge Swan, dissenting, argued that the deduction should be allowed, looking
to the legislative intent, since the power of appointment in the wife would be subject
to her estate tax. The judge cited the Senate Finance Committee Report, stating:
"This provision is designed to allow the marital deduction for such cases where
the value of the property over which the surviving spouse has a power of appointment will (if not consumed) be subject to either the estate tax or the gift tax in
the case of such surviving spouse."' 9 The "legislative intent" argument, while
frequently raised, has had limited acceptance as an argument upon which decision
is rested.
Looking at Pipe in the light of the 1954 Code, it would seem to have lost much
of its vitality as a leading case. It is no longer necessary that the property pass to
the surviving spouse in trust. Secondly, the statute no longer requires that the
spouse be able to appoint the corpus "free of the trust." This seemed to be the
phrase upon which the court declared that the wife's power of appointment during
her lifetime was limited. The decision denying that the bequest was an absolute
ownership under New York law still appears sound.
20
The Third Circuit applied very similar reasoning in Commissioner v. Ellis.
In this case, the widow was to receive all the income from a trust and had the
right to invade the corpus in such amounts as she required. Upon her death, onehalf of the corpus was to pass to her estate and one-half to decedent's children.
The court rightly allowed the deduction as to the one-half portion of the unconsumed corpus which would go to the wife's estate. Under the Tax Regulations,
either an unlimited power to invade during the lifetime or the power to devise is
sufficient to qualify for the deduction. 21 As in Pipe, the deduction was not allowed
to the one-half of the corpus which would go to the decedent's children. The
court held that even though the wife could invade at her discretion, she could not
appoint the children's one-half interest "free of the -trust." That is to say, she
could not defeat the testator's intent as to remaindermen unless for valid purposes.
Hence, her control was not unlimited. Ellis was also decided under the 1939 Code.
Before discussing the remaining principal cases in this area, it is necessary
to mention the Technical Amendments Act of 1958.2 Essentially, the amendment
applies the 1954 Code retroactively to estates of decedents dying after April 1, 1948
and before August 17, 1954.
As a result of the Technical Amendments Act, the Fifth Circuit, in 1958,
passed down two important decisions in which the marital deduction was allowed.
In Stallworth v. Commissioner,23 the wife was the beneficial owner, under the will,
of an undivided one-half interest in the testator's estate for a term of life. In addition, she had the power to invade and dispose of the one-half interest as she saw
fit. If it remained in the trust, then on the wife's death the remainder would be
disposed of according to the will.
The court first rejected the contention that the life tenancy, because of the
power of appointment, was the equivalent of a fee simple under Alabama law; it
is only where no remainder is limited on the estate of the donee that such estate
becomes an absolute fee. The court stated further that the estate did not qualify
for the deduction under Section 2056(b) (5) because the wife was not entitled to
all the income from the corpus of the trust and did not have power to appoint the
18 This point was an important factor in Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.
1960), which will be taken up later.
19 S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, pt. 2 (1948).
20 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
21 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (4) (1960).
22 TECH. AMEND. AcT of 1958, §93, 72 Stat. 1668. While Commissioner v. Ellis is dated
1958, it was decided before the Act was passed.
23 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958).
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entire corpus free of the trust.24 However, on rehearing, the marital deduction was
allowed to the one-half interest possessed by the surviving spouse. Under the 1954
Code, the estate or trust may consist of all the income from the entire interest or
the entire interest with the corresponding
all the income from
25 a specific portion of
power to appoint.
28
The other case coming out of the Fifth Circuit is McGehee v. Commissioner.
The devise was to the husband, with "full power to dispose of the same and to use
the income and corpus thereof in such a manner as he may determine, without
restriction or restraint." If any of such property remained in possession of the husband on his death, then the remainder went to the testator's brothers and sisters.
Again, the court determined that under the applicable local law (Florida) the life
estate with a power of appointment was not enlarged to a fee. Also, there was no
allowance under section 2056(b) (5) because the interest did not pass in trust.
On rehearing, however, the deduction was allowed, again because of the passage
of the Technical Amendments Act. Under the 1954 Code, the interest may pass
"whether or not in trust." 2 7 The Commissioner argued on the basis of the Ellis
decision that the interest here was not exercisable in all events. 28 The court distinguished Ellis"9 by holding that here the surviving spouse had power to dispose
"without restraint," e.g., he could give the property away, while in Ellis the power
was "as she required," which meant she could use the property only for herself.
The distinction may seem small, but in this area it may be important that the
drafter refrain from limits such as those set in Ellis. The power to make either a
testamentary or inter vivos gift will eliminate many tax stumbling blocks. It should
be noticed also that here the spouse was allowed, by gift, to defeat the remaindermen, an incident which did not disturb this court as much as it disturbed the Pipe
2 0

court.

The most recent and enlightening decision in the field of the life estate with
power of invasion is Hoffman v. McGinnes,31 in the Third Circuit. The will in
Hoffman created a trust from which the wife was given the income for life and
"the right to use and spend any or all of the principal of my said estate, if she so
desires ...and said trust shall cease as to that part of the principal so paid to her."
The balance, if any, remaining in the estate upon the wife's death went to certain
named remaindermen. The court first pointed out that the 1954 Code had made
two significant changes. It eliminated the requirements (1) that the life estate
must be devised in trust and (2) that the surviving spouse's right to income and
power to appoint must extend to the entire interest. However, the court stated
that the difference in the codes was of no importance in this decision.
24

The same phrases of the 1939 Code were crucial to the holding in Pipe v. Commissioner,

26
27
28

OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958).
INT. RV.CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
The powers which are also spoken of as being unqualified or unlimited more properly

it will be recalled.
25 INT. Rav. CODE

fit under the words of the statute "exercisable in all events."
There are many tax court cases which point out that some of the traditional standards
set for the surviving spouse's invasion of the corpus will defeat the marital deduction allowance.
Examples of standards making the power "not exercisable in all events" are: "comfort and
maintenance," Elwood Comer, 31 T.C. 1193 (1959) and E. W. Noble, 31 T.C. 888 (1959);
"happiness and well-being," Ralph May, 32 T.C. 386 (1959) ; "normal living expenses," Thomas
Tebb, 27 T.C. 671 (1957); "deemed to be in best interest," Harriet Evilsizor, 27 T.C. 710
(1957); "as she pleases for her support," Wallace Howell, 28 T.C. 1193 (1957). In Howell it
was held that controlling Ohio law holds such language to create a vested remainder subject
to divestment and the life estate is limited to consumption for support.
29 Commissioner v. Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
30 Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 814 (1957).
Boyd v. Gray, 175 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Ky. 1959), followed the Stallworth and McGehee de-

cisions. There the estate was left for life to the wife to be disposed of in any way she chose but
if any property was left at her death, then the remainder went to the testator's son.
31 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The district court relied on Ellis in denying the deduction but the circuit court
distinguished Ellis and reversed. To begin with, "... [plrecedents are of little value
in the construction of wills, because when used under different circumstances and
with different context, the same words may express different intentions." 3 2 The
court went on to distinguish Ellis in two material aspects. First, there was a power
to invade as the spouse "required" in that case whereas here the power was as she
"desired." It may be that under the applicable Pennsylvania law "required" would
limit the invasion to personal uses, but under a host of Pennsylvania decisions
included in the opinion, it would seem that "desired" would be interpreted as a
full power of appointment including the power to make gifts as required by the
Regulations.3 3 The second distinguishing aspect was that in Hoffman the language
stated that the "trust shall cease as to that part of the principal paid." This last
phrase is the most crucial in the decision and would be appropriate for the drafter's
files. The court was trying throughout the opinion to establish the testator's intent.
Did he intend that the spouse have the power to invade for any reason, including
giving the corpus away if she saw fit? Did he intend that the spouse should have
the power to cut out his named remaindermen if she so desired for any reason she
might have? The court answered yes to both questions, stating that under Pennsylvania law the marital deduction would be granted. The "trust shall cease' phrase
was seized upon as indicating the testamentary extinguishment of the remainder
interest as the corpus was used. In other words, the spouse could defeat the remainder interest for any reason or no reason. This may be important in states
which impose a duty on the spouse life tenant to refrain from squandering the
estate to deprive the remaindermen of their interest, as in Pipe v. Commissioner.
At any rate, Hoffman provides a healthy injection of the "testamentary intent"
test into the estate tax picture.
The Life Insurance Settlement Option
As indicated in the introductory remarks, under the settlement cases the proceeds of the policy are held by the insurer. Obviously, if there is an unqualified
lump sum payment to the surviving spouse and the amount is included in the decedent's gross estate the marital deduction applies. The proceeds, if held, may be
held at interest, distributed in installments, or in the form of a life annuity. If the
proceeds are retained by the insurer and a life annuity is paid to the spouse, a clear
example of a terminable interest is set up. If the annuity is non-refundable and
terminates at the spouse's death, or if refundable and paid to her estate, or if she
has a power of appointment over the installments "exercisable in all events" during
her life, the terminable interest will nevertheless qualify for the deduction.3" Insofar as the interest is terminable, the discussion of the life estate with a power of
appointment is also pertinent here. As in the life estate, two points must be remembered: (1) If the surviving spouse has testamentary power over the proceeds, the
deduction will be allowed even though she may have no inter vivos power.35 (2) If
the power of appointment is to be exercised by the spouse it must be "exercisable
in all events." More particularly, in the option area, it is important to keep in
mind that it is the state of affairs at the death of the testator that governs. For
example, if the surviving spouse chooses an option after the testator's death which
would not qualify, the deduction is not jeopardized. These general points must be
carried into all case analysis.
The decided cases dealing with eligibility of the life insurance settlement option
for the marital deduction fall generally into two distinct problem areas. One probIII.

32 In re Long's Estate, 270 Pa. 480, 113 A. 675 (1921).
33 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) (1960).
34 See generally Waldo, supra note 3.
35 Most insurance companies do not recognize the power to appoint proceeds by will and
therefore the appointment is generally by contract under one or more options in the policy.
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len is whether the wife has a power exercisable in all events when the policy provides that if she should die before due proof of her husband's death, or before
distribution, the proceeds will pass to another party. Analogous to this is the question of when administrative requirements may become significant enough to be
considered a limit on the power of appointment.
The other main problem leading to litigation is whether the property in interest
may be considered to be in separate portions when the option creates two interests,
one of which does not qualify for the marital deduction.
Werbe v. United States" is the key case in the "exercisable in all events" problem area. Under the insurance option contained in that policy, the surviving spouse
had the power to withdraw the proceeds in whole or in part with the following
restrictions: (1) The power of withdrawal could be exercised only on the monthly
interest payment days. (2) The company required a 90-day notice of intent to
withdraw. (3) A limit of four withdrawals of principal per year was imposed.
(4) The withdrawal had to be greater than $50, and the balance of the principal
could not be maintained at less than $100. The policy also provided that the
proceeds were to be payable on receipt of proof of death.
Looking at the provisions in the policy, the court held that the surviving spouse
had only a terminable interest and her power of appointment over the proceeds
was not exercisable in all events. The court reasoned that since the proceeds were
payable on receipt of proof of death and the right of withdrawal could be exercised
only on interest payment dates, the first of which came one month after the testator's
death, the power to withdraw was not exercisable in all events. If Mrs. Werbe
were to die while the option became operative, the proceeds would go to the remainderman.
The plaintiff introduced expert testimony by an executive of the insurer showing that the restrictions were mere administrative conveniences of the company
which in no way limited the wife's power of withdrawal. The witness further
testified that the wife could have withdrawn the entire proceeds immediately after
her husband's death if she, had so requested. To this the court replied that the
language of the contract was unambiguous and needed no interpretation by experts.
Certainly the Werbe case makes advisable a careful second look at the present
insurance option provisions by both the insured and the insurer. The case is discouraging; it ignores the realities of the situation more than does the approach
of the Third Circuit in the Hoffman case.37.
Another example of the more realistic approach of the Third Circuit is Eggleston v. Dudley.38 There the insured had intended to change the settlement provisions
of his policy so as to qualify for the marital deduction. In so doing, he produced
a direct contradiction as to whether the proceeds of the policy would go to his wife's
estate or to his estate in the event she died before proof of his death. The court
stated that in resolving the conflict under Pennsylvania law the intent of the parties
should be honored and in this case the provisions of the policy would be interpreted
so as to obtain the deduction. The court also held that settlement "upon receipt
of due proof of death" did not mean that the widow was not entitled to the proceeds of the policy upon the death of her husband but only that she could not
receive the proceeds until then. This reasoning appears to contradict the holding
in the Werbe case.
The court alluded to the importance of local law in this area in the Eggleston
opinion. There are a number of other decisions on point which apply both to the
when there is local law precedent. For
insurance option and to the life estate
example, in Smith v. United States39 an estate was devised absolutely, followed by
36 273 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1959).
37 Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960).
38
39

257 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1958).
158 F. Supp. 344 (D. Colo. 1958).
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a provision that if the wife should die before distribution, then the devise would
lapse. The marital deduction was allowed because under Colorado law the property
was absolutely vested and not vested subject to divestment.40
The second major litigious problem, that of divided proceed interests, is illustrated by Reilly v. Commissioner.4 1 The policy provided for a distribution of proceeds for a period of 10 years certain and thereafter for the life of the wife. If the
wife died within the 10-year period, the remaining installments were to go to remaindermen. The tax court held that "property" as used in the statute4 2 includes
all proceeds payable under the contract. The Third Circuit reversed and allowed
the deduction as to that portion of the proceeds funding the contingent annuity
after the 10-year period. The insurance company had set up two funds out of the
total proceeds, one for the 10-year period and one for the annuity. The deduction
was applied to the fund set out of the proceeds for the annuity. Looking at the
statute and regulations the court stated that the word property is imprecisely defined
and cannot be fit into a rigid formula. It must be interpreted in the light of the
particular case circumstances. The court went on to say that there were two bundles
of rights at the time of the husband's death. True, there was only one fund, but
the actuary computation of the amounts needed to fund each of the two rights
was practically necessary. Thus, for tax purposes, there were two funds or properties, and the deduction applied to one of them. There would have been no ultimate
tax avoidance; if the wife lived to collect the annuity it would have been taxed
in her estate.
In Meyer v. United States43 the Second Circuit repudiated the Reilly decision.

The issue as stated by the court is whether the estate is entitled to the marital deduction for a portion of the proceeds of a life insurance policy when the whole proceeds are held by the insurer under a settlement option, the terms of which provide
that the spouse receive monthly payments for the remainder of her life, but if she
should die within 20 years then the remainderman is to receive payments until the
20-year period is lapsed. The district court found the portion of the proceeds
allocable to the funding of the contingent life annuity after the 20-year period
qualified for the deduction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the whole
of the proceeds as held by the insurer constituted the "property" and that each
fund was not a separate unit of property under the statute. The court distinguished
between an interest and property as used in the Regulations44 and held the two
funds to be separate interests but one unit of property. The contract did not request or provide for a segregation of the proceeds; the company did it as a practical
matter, and for tax purposes there was only one fund. The dissent would have followed the Reilly case. Language in Reilly also indicated the court believed that
the segregation was a practical matter but made necessary by the two rights set
up in the contract. Throughout the marital deduction area the Third Circuit
seems to have the better and more consistent approach to the marital deduction
problem. However, the conflict between the Reilly and Meyer cases was resolved
in favor of the Second Circuit when the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
the Meyer case this term.4"
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the Reilly and Meyer cases, the decision of the Supreme Court appears questionable. In the majority opinion, the
40 Accord: Martinson v. Wright, 181 F. Supp. 534 (D. Idaho 1959); Steele v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mont. 1956); Kellar v. Kasper, 138 F. Supp. 738 (D.S. Dak.
1956). See also: Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942). Contra: California Trust Co. v.
Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. CaL. 1955).
41 239 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957).
42 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2056(b) (6). "In the case of an interest in property
passing.... "
43 275 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted 361 U.S. 929 (1960).
44 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6 (1960).
45 Meyer v. United States 81 S.Ct. 210 (Nov. 21, 1960). This decision was handed down
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Court adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit, while the three dissenters
approved of the reasoning of the Third Circuit as expressed in the Reilly decision.
From a practical viewpoint, the drafter of insurance settlement provisions will
take notice of the fact that the Court held open the possibility of providing, in the
contract, for the segregation of the funds necessary to pay the contingent life
annuity. This should prove to be a worthwhile tip in view of the fact that the
Court held that there were two interests under the contract, -but only one property
right. A direct order to the insurer to segregate the funds would probably be held
to create two rights and thus, in cases such as Meyer, to qualify for the marital
deduction.
IV.

Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis, it is readily apparent that the law concerning
the applicability of the marital deduction to the life insurance option and the life
estate with a power of disposition is in a confused state. As indicated, the Third
Circuit seems to be applying the law most consistently, following the legislative
intent. Needless to say, however, this is of little comfort to the estate planner or
tax counsel who is in another jurisdiction.
It may be desirable to reiterate some of the most basic principles to bear in
mind when working in this area. The most important concept to remember is
stated in the Regulations:
A power is not considered to be a power exercisable for a limited purpose
only.... Likewise, if there are any restrictions either by the terms of the
instrument or under applicable local law, on the exercise of a power to
consume property . . . for the benefit of the spouse, the power is not exercisable in all events. Thus, if a power is exercisable only for the spouse's
support,
48 or only for her limited use, the power is not exercisable in all
events.

The Regulations go on to say that the spouse must have unrestricted power, including the power to dispose of the property by gift. Of course, if the spouse has power
to dispose by will, her lifetime power may be restricted. Unfortunately for the
testator, the classic standards for invasion of the corpus used in the life estate,
which may make it attractive to him (e.g., comfort, support, maintenance, so long
as she does not remarry, etc.) will keep the estate from qualifying for the deduction.
Thus, while this paper is concerned only with the tax consequences, the drafter will
often have to weigh the human and tax aspects in drafting the testamentary
instrument.
Looking to the insurance option, some hints for the insurer were provided
by the cases which denied deduction. For example, from the language in the
Werbe case two possible solutions would seem to be: (1) give the widow an unqualified power to exercise her withdrawal privilege but give the company a right to
delay payment until the next interest day; (2) give her the power to direct the
proceeds to her estate. Either would qualify, regardless of lifetime restrictions."7
Likewise, the Meyer case indicates the possibility of providing in the contract
for the segregation of the funds needed to pay for the contingent life annuity.
The Supreme Court decision did not eliminate the Meyer problem.
Other than the above suggestions, the only safe course is to incorporate in the
instrument the exact phrases that have been determined to be correct by the
particular jurisdiction involved. In the future it may be that the approach of the
Third Circuit will gain wider judicial adoption or be accorded favor by the Tax
Regulations and the prosecuting division of the Treasury Department.
Edward M. O'Toole
after this Note was substantially completed: the comments herein are primarily in terms of the
Court of Appeals decision. See 29 U.S.L. WEEK 4041 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1960).
46 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) (1960) (emphasis added).
47 Waldo, supra note 3.

